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Abstract This article provides a review of what we
know, what we do not know, and what we need to know
about the relationship between industrial clusters and cor-
porate social responsibility (CSR) in developing countries.
In addition to the drivers of and barriers to the adoption of
CSR initiatives, this study highlights key lessons learned
from empirical studies of CSR initiatives that aimed to
improve environmental management and work conditions
and reduce poverty in local industrial districts. Academic
work in this area remains embryonic, lacking in empirical
evidence about the effects of CSR interventions on the
profitability on local enterprises, workers, and the envi-
ronment. Nor do theoretical frameworks offer clear
explanations of the institutionalization and effects of CSR
in local industrial districts in the developing world. Other
key limitations in this research stream include an excessive
focus on export-oriented industrial clusters, the risk that
CSR becomes a form of economic and cultural
imperialism, and the potential for joint-action CSR initia-
tives in clusters of small and medium-sized enterprises to
offer a new form of greenwashing. From this review, the
authors develop a theoretical model to explain why CSR
has not become institutionalized in many developing
country clusters, which in turn suggests that the vast
majority of industrial clusters in developing countries are
likely to engage in socially irresponsible behavior.
Keywords Corporate social responsibility  Developing
countries  Industrial clusters
How do enterprises located in distinct geographical regions
in the developing world compete globally, without compro-
mising the economic, social, and environmental interests of
their stakeholders, including owners, employees, and local
communities? This question constitutes the heart of research
into corporate social responsibility (CSR) in industrial clus-
ters located in developing countries (Accountability 2006).
Considering the preliminary state of this research stream, we
need to provide some definitions before we can start
answering the question; specifically, we adopt Blowfield and
Frynas’s (2005, p. 503) definition of CSR:
an umbrella term for a variety of theories and prac-
tices all of which recognize the following: (a) that
companies have a responsibility for their impact on
society and the natural environment, sometimes
beyond legal compliance and the liability of indi-
viduals; (b) that companies have a responsibility for
the behavior of others with whom they do business
(e.g., within supply chains); and (c) that business
needs to manage its relationship with wider society,
whether for reasons of commercial viability or to add
value to society.
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Furthermore, we define clusters as geographical con-
centrations of companies operating in the same or related
industries (Giuliani 2005), such that they can help ensure
local economies prosper in the increasingly open, liberal-
ized global economy (Humphrey and Schmitz 2002). As
Kaplinsky (2000) states, it is not a question of whether
local economies should engage in the global economy; it is
a question of how and on which terms. That is, engagement
might lead to sustained equitable income growth, or it
could prompt a social and environmental race to the bottom
in industrial clusters.
In the 1990s, many articles and policy papers promoted
local economic growth through cluster development (Sch-
mitz and Nadvi 1999), often by highlighting the benefits for
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) located in
industrial districts in developing countries (Nadvi 1999a;
Schmitz 2004). Joining a cluster seemingly could help
SMEs reduce the transaction costs associated with running
their business, by making it easier for them to access
specialized suppliers, local support agencies, training
institutes, a skilled workforce, relevant consultants, and
logistics firms that could help their business grow (Hum-
phrey and Schmitz 2002). Their proximity with other
SMEs, operating in the same or related industries, also
would facilitate knowledge exchanges, horizontally
(between SMEs) and vertically (between lead SMEs and
their supply chain networks) (Posthuma and Nathan 2010).
Some authors argued further that local business associa-
tions and public–private partnerships could prompt initia-
tives to upgrade the production, processes, and marketing
competences of local SMEs in clusters (Bazan and Navas-
Aleman 2004; Nadvi 1999a), which would be critical if
cluster-based SMEs faced a common external challenge
that no single SME could handle alone. For example, new
market requirements, government regulations, or buyer
demands would fundamentally alter the competitive arena,
and local, cluster-based SMEs might address this challenge
more effectively than individual SMEs (Schmitz and Nadvi
1999).
Few studies have explored whether the development of
local clusters actually proceeds in such an economically,
socially, and environmentally responsible fashion though
(Battaglia et al. 2010; Hoivik and Shankar 2011; Testa
et al. 2012). Across various perspectives, rare articles rely
on CSR discourse (Accountability 2006). Instead, they
mainly consist of single case studies, highlighting the
potential role and limitations of cluster-based SMEs’
engagement in joint green initiatives, such as the investi-
gations of how joint-cluster initiatives have sought to
combat environmental pollution in Central American and
South Asian leather tannery, brick kiln, and textile clusters
through common effluent water treatment plans or cleaner
technologies (Crow and Batz 2006; Lund-Thomsen 2009).
To fill this persistent research gap, we offer a review of
what we know, what we do not know, and what we need to
know about CSR in developing country clusters. To begin,
we address the drivers of engagement in CSR in develop-
ing country clusters; and then we outline the academic and
policy-oriented debates regarding the role of CSR in
industrial districts in the developing world. The wide range
of studies we review deal with environmental management,
work conditions, and poverty reduction in local agglom-
eration economies in the Southern hemisphere. With this
basis, we provide an assessment of what we know about the
impacts of CSR initiatives in cluster settings and the the-
oretical underpinnings of extant literature, which reveals
some research limitations. In addition to developing an
analytical framework that we hope guides future investi-
gations of CSR in developing country clusters, we con-
clude by highlighting our main findings.
CSR in Industrial Clusters: Key Drivers
In academic literature pertaining to CSR in industrial
clusters in developing countries, the enforcement of gov-
ernmental regulations related to the environment and labor
laws often serves as a prerequisite for cluster engagement
in CSR (Kennedy 2006). However, we also find wide-
spread skepticism about the potential of so-called com-
mand and control or compliance-based approaches for
improving environmental and labor standards in clusters
(Blackman 2006). In India for example, Dasgupta (2000)
asserts that the enforcement of environmental laws has
been largely ineffective, because the enforcement process
ignores the micro-level reality for many SMEs, which tend
to operate in informal or semi-formal settings. Entrepre-
neurs often are unaware of environmental laws and regu-
lations; lack the technical, financial, and managerial
capacities required to implement legislation; and operate
on a short-term basis that makes it difficult, if not impos-
sible, for them to perceive the business benefits related to
environmental management. Thus, the enforcement of
environmental legislation (i.e., closing polluting SMEs) has
driven hundreds of thousands of small-scale, poor entre-
preneurs out of their jobs, with the resultant loss of live-
lihoods for themselves and their families, without
necessarily improving the environmental behaviors of
other cluster-based SME entrepreneurs (Dasgupta 2000).
Prior literature also emphasizes the importance of
business associations, as leaders of the implementation of
environmental initiatives by clusters (Accountability 2006;
Blackman and Kildegaard 2010; Lund-Thomsen and Pillay
2012). However, simply involving business associations
does not guarantee the successful implementation of clus-
ter-wide CSR initiatives. Industry associations tend to vary
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and feature members with highly divergent interests. For
the Jalandhar football cluster for example, entrepreneurs
eventually had to form a separate foundation, the Sports
Goods Foundation of India, to address the issue of child
labor in football manufacturing, which threatened the
cluster’s reputation among international buyers (Lund-
Thomsen and Nadvi 2010a). Cricket manufacturers had not
been directly involved in any media reports of child labor
in the broad sporting goods cluster though, so they had
little incentive to help football producers in Jalandhar
address this issue (Lund-Thomsen and Nadvi 2009).
Moreover, clusters are not equal in their relative man-
agerial capacity, financial clout, and entrepreneurial vision.
Some cluster associations (e.g., the Kaur tanneries cluster
in Pakistan) represent the interests of a few larger firms,
largely ignoring the needs of many SMEs, and particularly
microenterprises, operating therein (Lund-Thomsen 2009).
In such cases, it becomes difficult to secure sufficient buy-
in for cluster-wide CSR initiatives across all firms in the
cluster (Accountability 2006). For some smaller firms, it
may simply be financially unviable to contribute to joint
efforts, especially if they engage only in seasonal produc-
tion or operate with very low margins (Blackman 2006).
The social networks that link particular production
clusters also may help explain the relative strength or
weakness of business associations for engaging in joint-
action CSR initiatives. In a study of the Palar Valley tan-
nery clusters, Kennedy (1999) shows that leather tanneries
in some key clusters were owned by a tightly knit Muslim
community, operating in Hindu-majority areas. Despite
occasional tensions between the Muslim owners/managers
and Hindu workers, it proved an effective tool for moni-
toring member behavior and applying peer pressure to
ensure member involvement in the financing and opera-
tions of common effluent water treatment plants by the
cluster (Kennedy 2006).
These studies suggest an emerging consensus that the
combination of different drivers, rather than any single
factor alone, produces socially and environmentally
responsible behavior within clusters (Blackman 2006; Lund-
Thomsen and Nadvi, 2010a; Tewari and Pillai 2005). In this
connection, Blackman (2006) points out that command and
control policies are in themselves insufficient, unless they
are buttressed by informal regulation and peer monitoring.
Cluster-based SMEs are too numerous to be monitored
effectively by government regulatory authorities in devel-
oping countries, which often lack the financial and human
resources needed to perform virtually any such monitoring
functions. The cluster-based entrepreneurs also are politi-
cally powerful and maintain close connections with existing
regulatory authorities, through support for political
campaigns or bribes that prevent officials from enforcing
environmental and labor laws (Blackman 2006). In such
contexts, private sector-led initiatives, in which business
associations take charge of implementing environmental
measures and engage in peer monitoring, may be more
effective than a reliance on governmental enforcements to
induce cluster-wide changes in SMEs’ environmental
behavior (Blackman and Kildegaard 2010). Local monitor-
ing by trade unions or community-based protests also could
prove effective in creating positive environmental change in
clusters, because cluster-based SMEs tend to be tightly
connected to local social networks and subject to strong peer
pressure (i.e., held accountable for their actions), which
affects their overall standing and reputation in the commu-
nities in which they are embedded (Nadvi 1999b; Vives
2006). In this sense, the combination of top-down and bot-
tom-up pressures appears to create the best circumstances for
improved environmental regulation of clusters.
Among the key barriers to implementing joint-action
CSR initiatives, we identify the lack of willingness among
developing country governments to enforce their own labor
and environmental laws (Prieto-Carron et al. 2006). Eco-
nomic development imperatives often override social or
environmental considerations—a tendency observed in
cluster studies across Latin America, Africa, and Asia
(Accountability 2006). In addition, many cluster-based
entrepreneurs adopt reactive attitudes, seeking to block the
enforcement of environmental laws or pollution control
initiatives, often by bribing or threatening public officials.
Other studies cite the lack of organized unions and sub-
contracting of production as key obstacles to improving
work conditions in clusters (Khara and Lund-Thomsen
2012). For example, studies of the Sialkot (Pakistan) and
Jalandhar (India) football-manufacturing clusters reveal
that cluster-based entrepreneurs sometimes actively work
to break local trade unions so that they can ensure the
stability of production and thus their profit margins. In one
tactic, entrepreneurs would send some factory workers to
work out of their homes, also rehiring some of them as
subcontractors, which reduced the formality of the pro-
duction process (Jamali et al., forthcoming). Because
employees worked at their decentralized homes, instead of
in factories, it became virtually impossible for local trade
unions to organize the workforce, leverage their right to
collective bargaining, or achieve freedom of association
(Khan 2007a). Finally, participation in local value chains
may reduce local producers’ incentives to improve their
environmental and labor records. In India for example, the
vast majority of industrial clusters are locally oriented, so
no global value chain incentives exist to prompt them to
improve their practices (Gulati 2012) (Table 1).
Corporate Responsibility: Theoretical and Qualitative Studies
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Main Features of the Cluster and CSR Debate
Literature on industrial clusters and CSR in developing
country clusters comprises three broad thematic categories:
(a) environmental management, (b) work conditions more
broadly, and (c) poverty reduction.
Studies of CSR and Environmental Management
in Developing Country Industrial Clusters
Studies of environmental management often investigate the
uses of clusters to address environmental pollution prob-
lems caused by SMEs in developing countries, in an effort
to determine whether clustered SMEs enhance or harm the
natural environment in these industrial districts. An
emerging consensus indicates that the manufacturing
operations of cluster-based SMEs have widespread, nega-
tive environmental consequences, especially in industries
such as brick-making, textiles, and leather manufacturing
(Blackman 2006).
Prior literature also makes a business case for environ-
mental improvements in cluster-based SMEs, by attempt-
ing to demonstrate how cluster-based firms can improve
their financial positions by participating voluntarily in
joint-action, cluster-based CSR interventions. In practice,
this participation often follows the introduction of CSR
initiatives that help SMEs reduce their operational costs
(Gulati 2012). However, other studies find no business case
for investing in environmental management improvements
within clusters (Accountability 2006); smaller firms and
micro-enterprises in particular have a hard time shoulder-
ing the costs of contributing financially to implement joint-
action CSR initiatives. Many of them engage in job-
working, serve as subcontractors for larger firms, or work
only for certain months of the year, so their profit margins
are very small or non-existent (Lund-Thomsen 2009).
Another pertinent theme is the relative effectiveness of
pre- versus end-of-pipe treatment of environmental
pollution emanating from cluster-based SMEs. Similar to
that in environmental management literature in general, the
consensus appears to be that the introduction of cleaner
technologies is preferable (Blackman 2006; Mbohwa et al.
2010) but potentially not sufficient on its own. Instead,
such efforts must be combined with end-of-pipe treatment,
such as waste-water treatment plants or filters that can curb
air pollution (Lund-Thomsen 2009).
A related debate for environmental management in
industrial clusters in developing countries involves whether
individual or common effluent treatment plants are more
effective for reducing the pollution created by leather
tanneries and textile factories (Kennedy 2006; Patel et al.
2013; Rathi 2013). One argument holds that only larger
firms can shoulder the costs of establishing individual
treatment facilities, and the lack of physical space within a
cluster, particularly in urban areas, makes the use of
common effluent treatment plants the most viable option
for treating waste water (Lund-Thomsen 2009). However,
common effluent treatment plants are not without chal-
lenges. Despite their strong potential for improving the
quality of waste water from tannery and textile clusters in
developing countries (Blackman 2006), some plants con-
sistently underperform, because they lack the technical
capacity to treat water to such a level that it becomes safe
for human or animal consumption. In addition, common
effluent treatment plants may suffer free-rider problems
(e.g., some members fail to pay dues) and conflicts, espe-
cially if large factories in the cluster dominate the decision-
making processes, at the expense of SMEs (Lund-Thomsen
2009).
Across these approaches, a key weakness is that envi-
ronmental management in industrial clusters often gets
portrayed as a problem in need of the ‘‘right’’ technical or
policy-oriented solutions. The answer to complex pollution
problems is thus better management practices or improved
environmental technologies (e.g., Puppim de Oliveira
2008a). Yet such a view inappropriately downplays or
ignores the role of power and politics in the environmental
management of clusters (Lund-Thomsen 2004), which
suggest an opportunity to apply more critical perspectives.
For example, research on political ecology in developing
countries highlights how unequal power relations among
different actors (e.g., the state, multinational corporations,
international organizations, civil society, communities)
mediate human–environment interactions, resulting in
disproportionate allocations of environmental pollution
burdens to poorer, low-income groups that are not suffi-
ciently organized, politically influential, or aware to defend
their interests and rights (Bailey and Bryant 1997). Such a
political ecology perspective on environmental manage-
ment in industrial clusters thus may be helpful for
explaining why particular joint-action CSR initiatives
Table 1 Drivers behind and barriers to CSR adoption in developing
country clusters
Drivers Barriers
Enforcement of national
laws
Non-enforcement of national laws
Business associations Cluster firms threatening or
Peer monitoring Bribing law enforcement officials
Social networks Cluster firms’ suppression of trade
unions
Informal regulation SMEs lacking CSR awareness/capacity
Participation in global Intra-cluster subcontracting processes
Value chains Participation in local value chains
P. Lund-Thomsen et al.
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benefit or harm some firms, workers, and community
members in some clusters, some of the time (Newell
(2005), such that we could move beyond technical, man-
agement-oriented to more politically and economically
based explanations of CSR in industrial clusters.
Studies of CSR and Work Conditions in Developing
Country Industrial Clusters
Beyond environmental management, we find few studies
that investigate whether CSR initiatives improve working
conditions in developing country clusters. Child labor is the
primary concern raised in studies of export-oriented clus-
ters or those that sell to markets dominated by large, brand-
sensitive multinational companies (e.g., Nike, Adidas). In
their comparative analysis of joint-cluster CSR initiatives
in the football-manufacturing clusters of Sialkot (Pakistan)
and Jalandhar (India), Lund-Thomsen and Nadvi (2010a)
highlight how the differential integration of these clusters
into the world economy largely determined the kinds of
CSR initiatives they developed. In Sialkot, some local
manufacturers joined high-end value chains, whose end
buyers included famous, international sports brands such as
Nike; the firms in the Jalandhar football cluster instead
tended to export footballs to smaller brands in Europe,
North America, and the developing world. The pressure on
local cluster firms to address child labor issues thus was
much tougher in Sialkot, and the development of a cluster-
wide monitoring mechanism in turn was stronger and more
independent in Sialkot than in Jalandhar. In contrast, the
Jalandhar producers had more space to develop their own,
locally oriented solutions to child labor issues, whereas in
Sialkot, large international development agencies (e.g.,
ILO, UNICEF) essentially designed and drove the CSR
interventions (Lund-Thomsen and Nadvi 2012).
Such studies are important for highlighting the roles of
multinational companies, international donor agencies, and
cluster associations in creating or solving child labor con-
cerns in export-oriented production, yet child labor in
domestically oriented clusters is rarely the subject of any
detailed analysis. For example, in Pakistan, several studies
note the widespread use of bonded child labor in brick kiln
clusters, but these bricks mainly supply house construction
within the country, such that some of the ‘‘worst instances
of child labor’’ are not on the agenda of Western advocacy
groups, consumer organizations, or trade unions to the
same extent—as they might be if the products were sold
directly to Western consumers (Lund-Thomsen 2008).
In developing country clusters, the implementation of
ethical guidelines or corporate codes of conduct in global
value chains dominated by international retailers and
supermarkets directly affect workers (De Neve 2009).
Literature on labor agency in industrial clusters (and global
value chains) thus highlights how workers exercise agency
to improve their own working conditions. Labor agency
traditionally has been defined as organized labor, in the
form of trade unions that seek to influence employers
(mostly in the formal sector) and ensure workers’ rights to
collective bargaining and freedom of association (Coe and
Hess 2013). A more recent conceptualization of labor
agency also includes the active choices that unorganized
workers make about their employment and broader liveli-
hood (Carswell and De Neve 2013). For example, workers
opt in or out of work places according to their gender, age,
life cycle, and personal preferences. Recent studies of the
labor agency of unorganized workers in the Tiruppur gar-
ment cluster in India and the Sialkot football-manufactur-
ing cluster in Pakistan implicate Western codes of conduct,
because they favor workers who can maintain a stable, 8-h
work routine, earn fixed wages, feel comfortable laboring
in tightly monitored work environments, and adapt to
factory-based work environments. As De Neve (2014)
cautions though, this emphasis ignores the need of other
workers who prefer flexible work hours, less rigorous
monitoring, piece rates, or the ability to combine domestic
duties (e.g., child rearing, household work) with earning a
living. For such workers, laboring in semi-formal work-
shops or home-based locations might be preferable. Lund-
Thomsen (2013) also notes that the nature of labor agency
in South Asian clusters (or clusters more broadly) may be
constrained by local gender norms, the spatial location of
workers, their livelihood strategies, and the modes by
which they are recruited. This literature stream thus reveals
the importance of studying the specificities of local work
and employment contexts, as well as the nature of global
and local value chains, to be able to determine the actual
(or lack of) possibilities that workers have for improving
their working conditions.
Studies of CSR and Poverty Reduction in Developing
Country Industrial Clusters
Few authors have systematically investigated the role of
CSR interventions in addressing poverty reduction in
developing country clusters (Lund-Thomsen and Pillay
2012). Perhaps, the only exception is Nadvi and Barrien-
tos’s (2004) effort to create a conceptual framework for
studying such interconnections on the basis of their review
of empirical evidence pertaining to the interface of clusters
and poverty reduction. These authors argue that industrial
clusters and poverty reduction feature three conceptual
links: cluster features, cluster processes, and cluster
dynamics. First, Nadvi and Barrientos explain that clusters
in rural areas, functioning in an informal economy, marked
by a majority of SMEs and microenterprises, or that feature
Corporate Responsibility: Theoretical and Qualitative Studies
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women, migrants, unskilled laborers, and homeworkers
could have a particularly positive role in terms of reducing
poverty in developing countries. Second, with regard to
cluster processes, ‘‘agglomeration economies reduce costs
and raise the capabilities of workers and producers. Cluster
joint action takes such capabilities further, strengthening
capacity of local firms, and reducing vulnerability to
external shocks’’ (Nadvi and Barrientos 2004, p. v). Third,
the authors highlight that clusters are dynamic over time,
such that they engage in upgrading their products and
processes, move into higher value-added functions, and use
the experience they have gained in one industry to gain
competitive advantages in another. Alternatively, they
might downgrade, by lowering the quality of their products
and production processes or shifting to lower value-added
functions in the value chain. Rather than any established
relationship between cluster development and poverty
reduction, it appears that changes in industrial clusters
produce winners and losers over time, among both cluster
firms and workers.
Regarding the question of whether joint-action CSR
initiatives in industrial cluster affect poverty reduction, we
find virtually no studies that look explicitly at this linkage
(cf. Mezzadri 2010). However, some evidence points to a
potential connection of CSR initiatives (i.e., imposition of
corporate codes in global value chains) and their potential
impact on poor workers laboring in industrial clusters in
developing countries (South Asia in particular; Khara and
Lund-Thomsen 2012). Attempts to apply CSR norms to
non-factory realms in clusters actually may produce con-
tradictory results, reinforce the class distinction between
contractors in the cluster, and heighten the incompatibility
between pro-capital and pro-labor agendas in the value
chain (Mezzadri 2014a). As such, a contradiction may arise
between the typical features of labor-intensive clusters in
developing countries—such as flexibility, production spe-
cialization, job-working, and extensive subcontracting to
meet varying national and international demand—and the
demands for stable, well-paid, year-round employment
opportunities with full labor rights (Mezzadri 2014b).
According to Khara and Lund-Thomsen’s (2012) study of
subcontracting arrangements in the Jalandhar football
cluster, local firms face perverse incentives when it comes
to protecting labor rights: changing, often seasonal, inter-
national demand for footballs compels local manufacturers
to use extensive networks of labor contractors that can hire
workers in the informal economy on an on-demand basis.
The basic condition for establishing successful country
cluster-level firms in this globally competitive industry
thus seems to be that workers are paid poverty-level wages.
In other words, the development of a cluster may be
inextricably linked to irresponsible business practices that
require workers to stay in poverty (rather than escape it) for
the industry to remain internationally competitive
(Table 2).
Impacts of CSR Initiatives in Developing Country
Industrial Clusters
Even as emerging literature describes how CSR initiatives
seek to address environmental management challenges,
poor work conditions, and widespread poverty in devel-
oping country clusters, we know little about the actual
impacts of these initiatives on the profitability of local
SMEs, workplace conditions, or environmental pollution
levels in the clusters (Lund-Thomsen and Pillay 2012). The
relatively few empirical studies that discuss the effects of
economic, social, and or environmental joint-action ini-
tiatives in developing country clusters have not developed
rigorous or systematic impact assessment methodologies
for studying the effects of the joint-action CSR initiatives.
Moreover, they fail to provide baseline data that describe
the economic, labor, or environmental conditions within a
cluster prior the implementation of a joint-action CSR
initiative. Without control groups, there is no means to
create a comparative basis for assessing whether any
observed changes in the economic, social, and environ-
mental conditions of cluster firms and workers can be
attributed to the implementation of a joint-action CSR
initiative or to other causal factors. Instead, we have mostly
anecdotal evidence from detailed case studies of joint CSR
action initiatives in developing countries, and the authors
rarely discuss what type of case study they employ—such
as an extreme, paradigm, unique, comparative, or other
type (see Flyvbjerg 2006)—to help readers assess the
extent to which it is possible to generalize their findings.
That is, when it comes to establishing a firm basis for
making claims about the effects of joint-action CSR
Table 2 Main topics in the cluster and CSR literature
Area of research Main topics
Clusters and
environmental
management
Business case for environmental
improvements
Cleaner technology versus end-of-pipe
treatment
Effectiveness of individual versus
common effluent treatment plants
Focus on technical fixes instead of
political solutions to environmental
problems
Clusters and work
conditions
Child labor (monitoring)
Labor agency in clusters
Clusters and poverty
reduction
Cluster features, processes, and dynamics:
their implications for poverty alleviation
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interventions in developing country clusters, much work
remains to be done.
Using just the available anecdotal evidence though, it
appears as if joint-action CSR policies and projects offer a
license to operate for clusters that sell to high value-added
markets in Western Europe or North America. In that case,
local SMEs must engage in such initiatives—sometimes
labeled public–private partnerships (Lund-Thomsen 2009) or
multi-stakeholder initiatives—if they hope to maintain their
access to these Western markets (Dolan and Opondo 2005).
Some joint-cluster initiatives have succeeded in securing at
least rudimentary improvements, such as treatment of highly
polluted water. Initiatives aimed at greening clusters also
appear to have raised environmental awareness among
entrepreneurs and facilitated the spread of environmentally
friendly technologies in some locations (Accountability 2006;
Blackman 2006; Crow and Batz 2006; Tewari and Pillai
2005). Yet severe problems persist for ensuring the imple-
mentation and long-term sustainability of these initiatives
(Kennedy 1999, 2006). Particularly in relation to water
treatment plants, free-riding problems appear common,
because few SMEs can shoulder their portion of the costs of
running the treatment plant. Moreover, some cluster-based
SMEs join domestic value chains, in which end-customers
simply are less concerned about environmental management
at the supplier level (Lund-Thomsen 2009).
Finally, the limited anecdotal evidence about the effects of
joint CSR action on workers’ conditions is mixed. Some
studies highlight the importance of disaggregating the notion
of the ‘‘worker,’’ using gender, age, occupation, education,
life cycle status, skill level, and other factors that determine
howworkersmight be affected by joint-actionCSR initiatives
(see De Neve 2014). For example, studies of CSR interven-
tions in the Sialkot football-manufacturing industry note the
differentiated effects of CSR initiatives within the cluster
(Khan 2007a, b), in that for some (primarily male) workers,
the introduction of a CSR-compliant factory and semi-CSR-
compliant center-basedwork led to higher wages,more social
protection, and a more organized work environment. How-
ever, for other categories of (female) workers, these CSR
measures largely excluded them from the supply chains of
leading brands, because male family members prohibited
them from leaving their homes to work in more centralized
production sites (e.g., centers, factories) (Lund-Thomsen
2013). Paraphrasing Nadvi and Barrientos (2004), it appears
as if joint cluster-basedCSR interventions create bothwinners
and losers among local firms and workers.
Theoretical Frameworks
Theoretical frameworks linking the notions of CSR and
industrial clusters are few and far between. As part of our
literature review, we identified four studies that refer
loosely to the broader responsibilities of business in
developing country clusters (Lund-Thomsen and Nadvi
2010a, b; Puppim de Oliveira 2008b; Puppim de Oliveira
and Jabbour 2011; Pyke 2010).
In their framework, Lund-Thomsen and Nadvi (2010b)
raise the question of whether corporate codes of conduct in
local industrial clusters can be implemented better through
global value chain governance or local cluster governance.
Global value chain governance refers to the power of
multinational companies to determine the kinds of pro-
ducts/services to produce (i.e., where, in what quantity, at
what price, and in which social and environmental condi-
tions). Local cluster governance instead relies on collective
action institutions, such as business associations, chambers
of commerce, and other trade bodies, to take the lead in
implementing corporate codes of conduct in cluster set-
tings, which might be an option for institutionalizing CSR
in local industrial districts in the developing world. These
authors conclude that global value chain governance can
facilitate the emergence of a more independent form of
CSR monitoring in cluster settings, because it encourages
external scrutiny from global brands. However, local
cluster governance likely facilitates stronger local owner-
ship of the CSR monitoring initiatives. In turn, Nadvi and
Lund-Thomsen propose a potential trade-off of the inde-
pendence versus the local ownership of CSR initiatives in
cluster settings in developing countries, when they are
implemented in clusters tied into global value chains.
In a discussion of social upgrading in developing
country clusters, Puppim de Oliveira (2008b) argues that
clusters that pay taxes, spur social development, and abide
by environmental, health, and labor laws engage in three
forms of social upgrading. First, they become integrated
into global value chains that expose the cluster-based
SMEs to the requirements of international buyers for
environmentally friendly production and workplace stan-
dards. Second, social upgrading can happen through cluster
engagement in CSR, understood as the voluntary engage-
ment of cluster-based SMEs, whether for ethical reasons or
commercial considerations, in improving the social and
environmental conditions in their developing country
clusters. Third, Puppim de Oliveira suggests that social
upgrading occurs in local economic regions through the
enforcement of labor, environmental, and safety laws by
national regulatory authorities, such as labor or environ-
mental ministries. In an updated version of this framework,
Puppim de Oliveira and Jabbour (2011) use the term ‘‘CSR
governance of clusters’’ to describe how these drivers can
bring about social and environmental improvements in
cluster settings.
These efforts are an initial attempt to articulate the
relationship between social upgrading (or what Puppim de
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Oliveira and Jabbour 2011 refer to as CSR) and industrial
clusters. The approaches reflected in this framework rep-
resent the kind of environmental management literature we
cited previously in this review, which regards environ-
mental problems as attributable to technical and/or man-
agement failures and open to repair through the right
technical or policy ‘‘fix.’’ As such, it does not offer much
insight into the role of unequal power relations between
actors, unequal access, or the distribution of resources in
producing environmental pollution and violations of labor
standards within clusters.
Pyke (2010) does not officially use the term CSR but
instead adopts the earlier social upgrading terminology to
describe an improvement in the quality and quantity of
work available in cluster settings. Pyke draws attention to
how the macro-, meso-, and micro-institutional environ-
ment of industrial clusters affect the potential for social
upgrading in local economic regions. His framework is
perhaps more comprehensive than Puppim de Oliveira’s
(2008b), because he distinguishes between ‘‘an enabling
environment’’ and the ‘‘key actors’’ in local cluster gov-
ernance for social upgrading. In the former category, Pyke
includes monetary and fiscal policies and the broader
framework in which social upgrading or downgrading may
take place. This factor rarely appears in studies of clusters
in the developing world as a whole, though macro-eco-
nomic trends, such as changing exchange rates, often have
significant influences on the export earnings of cluster-
based SMEs and thus the earnings that accrue to local firms
and workers. The enabling environment category also
includes traditional CSR factors, such as government reg-
ulation and private social, or environmental standards.
Pyke’s study then helpfully highlights the linkages between
this enabling environment and the role of particular actors
(e.g., governments, employers’ associations, workers’
organizations, communities) in influencing social upgrad-
ing within clusters. In this sense, Pyke’s (2010) framework
represents the most advanced attempt to theorize about the
forces that drive and/or undermine the engagement of
cluster firms in social upgrading (or what we would call
CSR).
Limitations
Both theoretical and empirical work on CSR in industrial
clusters in developing countries thus is still in its infancy.
The work undertaken thus far also suffers from several
limitations that should be addressed to advance our
understanding of CSR in developing country clusters.
First, global markets might not only promote the adop-
tion of CSR policies in industrial clusters in developing
countries. Participation in global value chains also tends to
render local industrial clusters vulnerable to the ebbs and
flow of global demand and to the sourcing strategies
employed by multinational companies. Bair and Gereffi
(2001) demonstrate that increasing demand from North
America initially expanded the industrial activity and
employment in Mexico’s Torreon blue jeans cluster, but
over time, as demand gradually fell and labor costs rose,
U.S. apparel buyers redirected their sourcing of blue jeans
elsewhere, leading to a kind of boom-and-bust economy for
the cluster. This process mirrors what Kaplinsky (2005) has
called immiserizing growth, such that industrial expansion
and increased exports is not followed by the creation of
more jobs or rising incomes in local industrial regions. In a
slightly different vein, Khara and Lund-Thomsen (2012)
highlight how local manufacturers in the Jalandhar football
cluster felt compelled to evade local labor laws, in the light
of the seasonal rise and fall of global demand for footballs.
Indian labor laws required the Jalandhar manufacturers to
grant hired workers the status of permanent employees
(with full social security); in response, the manufacturers
outsourced the most labor-intensive manufacturing step,
football stitching, to home-based locations. Although the
cluster also engaged in philanthropic projects designed to
help football stitchers and their families, it simultaneously
felt compelled to adopt ‘‘socially irresponsible’’ practices
that denied its labor force formal recognition and rights as
workers, under Indian labor laws. Individual case studies
that document the design and implementation of joint-
action CSR initiatives in developing clusters have value,
but we also must pay greater attention to how the broader
institutional context facilities or undermines the imple-
mentation, long-run sustainability, and potential benefits of
such initiatives.
Second, the literature on CSR in industrial clusters in
developing countries tend to focus on export-oriented
clusters, tied into global value chains. Such studies are
fashionable, especially in light of the continuing trends to
study global rather than local value chains, but they ignore
the existing ties of industrial clusters in developing coun-
tries with local value chains. As Mezzadri (2014b) docu-
ments, the rise of large, domestic buying firms in
developing countries represents an important new devel-
opment. In India’s garment industry, such domestic firms
largely perform the functions of lead firms, as literature on
global value chains has established. Noting cost-cutting
pressures and seasonal demand, domestic retailers and
brands replicate the sourcing patterns of different industrial
clusters across India to fit various volume and product
requirements (Mezzadri 2014b), which leads them to use a
relatively small (often casual) core set of workers, while
the larger workforce finds employment in smaller, infor-
mal, or home-based units. The idea of relinquishing
responsibility for labor management and using outsourcing
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to disempower workers through reliance on migratory labor
and unorganized female home workers thus remains a key
strategy for domestic Indian retailers and buyers. Studies of
CSR in industrial clusters in developing countries often cite
CSR pressures from Western branded firms but likely
overlook the more widespread, domestically oriented
clusters that feature far worse labor conditions. Accord-
ingly, we need more in-depth studies of domestically ori-
ented clusters, to understand how local (as opposed to
global) buyers help govern these domestic value chains
while also examining the potential for CSR (or more likely,
corporate social irresponsibility) in such cluster contexts.
Third, a related concern goes right to the heart of the
notion of CSR, in that some authors question whether
‘‘corporate social responsibility’’ is an appropriate term to
use in the context of SME clusters in the developing world
(Gulati 2012; Sachdeva and Panfil 2008). Small enterprises
are not corporations. Unlike large firms, SMEs tend to lack
any formalized CSR management procedures and instead
are managed by one or two key entrepreneurs, who enjoy
informal relations with their employees. Whereas large
corporations tend to present their CSR profiles in corporate
communications, the CSR engagement of SMEs may be less
visible or communicated only implicitly (Jenkins 2004). For
example, some SMEs engage in silent, invisible forms of
CSR tied to the religious beliefs or values of the founder or
rooted in its local social relations. Such norms might conflict
with the formalized codes of conduct that larger corporations
seek to spread throughout their global operations (Vives
2006). In India, different definitions exist—such as enter-
prise social responsibility, with particular reference to the
characteristics of SMEs (Sachdeva and Panfil 2008) or
simply ‘‘responsible business’’—to emphasize that all
businesses, regardless of their size, sector, or industry, have
broader economic, social, and environmental responsibili-
ties (Indian Ministry of Corporate Affairs 2011).
Fourth, the perhaps justified concern persists that CSR
might be just another ploy by Western corporations to
impose their will on enterprises in the developing world
(including those in SME clusters). Khan and Lund-Thom-
sen (2011) indicate that local entrepreneurs in the Sialkot
football-manufacturing cluster tend to perceive CSR as a
form of economic and cultural imperialism. The Western
brands earn much higher profits by selling the items in
Western markets than they pass on to their supplier firms.
In addition, many brands impose CSR requirements on
their suppliers, without agreeing to contribute to the cost of
implementing these measures. Local entrepreneurs also cite
CSR as a form of cultural imperialism, such as when
Western brands insist on eradicating child labor from the
process of football stitching, without considering that such
forms of labor might be a way for children to learn a new
skill to help them support themselves and their families in
the future, in a setting in which good schooling options
often are not available for poor families in distant, rural
villages.
Fifth, CSR may take the form of a greenwash, such that
socially and environmentally destructive corporations pose
as friends of the environment or leaders in the struggle
against global poverty (Corpwatch 2014), regardless of
their actual role. Cluster-based firms can take on an
appearance of being socially responsible by investing in a
wide range of philanthropic activities. As Jamali et al.
(forthcoming) note, the Jalandhar football-manufacturing
cluster in India has received national and international
awards for its philanthropic CSR (e.g., schools for former
child laborers, tuition centers for children, micro-credit
programs, medical camps). However, in practice, the SMEs
in this cluster continue to rely on a subcontracting system
that assigns the most labor-intensive step of football
manufacturing to the informal economy, in home-based
settings by workers who have no legal protection under
Indian labor laws. Accordingly, they have no contracts,
their earnings are below the Indian minimum wage, they
have no job or social security, and they tend to suffer from
occupational health and safety problems (e.g., deformed
fingers, scratches and pricks on their hands from the nee-
dles used to stitch the footballs) (Khara and Lund-Thomsen
2012). Local joint-action CSR initiatives can provide
industrial clusters with an appearance of being socially and
environmentally responsible, even as they simultaneously
adopt core business practices that are socially irresponsible
(Jamali et al., forthcoming). Studies of joint-action CSR
initiatives in developing country clusters therefore must
consider more than the CSR activities being implemented;
they also need to investigate the SMEs’ core business
practices and how they affect the labor and environmental
conditions within the cluster (Table 3).
A Theoretical Model of CSR (Non) Adoption
in Developing Country Clusters
On the basis of our literature review, we outline a theo-
retical model of CSR (Non) Adoption in developing
Table 3 Limitations of the cluster and CSR literature
Main points of critique
Overlooks negative effects imposed by buyer sourcing practices
Excessive focus on export-oriented clusters
Irrelevance of corporate social
Responsibility in SME clusters?
CSR in clusters as imperialism?
CSR in clusters as greenwash?
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country cluster by providing an overview of the factors that
might enhance or undermine the institutionalization of
CSR in such clusters. We begin by explaining each factor,
before discussing how, in combination, the factors interact
to determine the (dis)engagement of cluster-based firms in
socially (ir)responsible activities in the developing world.
First, global and regional value chains, spearheaded by
Western multinationals, can drive the institutionalization of
CSR practices in industrial clusters. Global value chains
provide a channel by which products and services get
designed, manufactured, transported, distributed, con-
sumed, and recycled in global, interfirm networks (Lund-
Thomsen et al. 2012). In this view, suppliers in industrial
districts may be compelled to comply with the CSR
requirements of Western multinationals if they hope to
survive in export-oriented industries, such as garments,
textiles, and football manufacturing (Lund-Thomsen and
Nadvi 2010a; Mezzadri 2010; Tewari and Pillai 2005).
North American and European multinationals in turn come
under pressure from campaigns or media stories that
highlight the poor work and environmental conditions for
production in developing countries, where environmental
and labor laws might be less strictly enforced (Bair and
Palpacuer 2012). However, some global value chains can
be less visible, such as when the buyers are SMEs
importing small orders (Lund-Thomsen and Nadvi 2010b).
In these less visible chains, local suppliers in SME clusters
have few incentives to embrace CSR practices. Whether
global value chains drive or impede the improvement and
implementation of CSR in developing country clusters thus
depends on the nature of the links among the clusters and
their international buyers. If industrial clusters instead
mainly participate in regional, national, or local value
chains, with buyers that are less concerned about CSR
compliance, there likely is no compelling business case for
cluster-based SME to engage in CSR.
Second, the (non)adoption of CSR practices by SMEs
might result from the national institutional contexts in
which the clusters are embedded. We use North’s (1990,
p. 3) definition of institutions as ‘‘the rules of the game in
society or, more formally,… the humanly devised con-
straints that shape human interaction.’’ Following Neilson
and Pritchard (2009), we also regard institutions as con-
sisting of formal rules and regulations that facilitate or
hinder the implementation of CSR measures, as well as of
informal societal norms, values, and ideas that shape con-
siderations of what is ‘‘socially responsible behavior’’ by
companies across divergent contexts (Matten and Moon
2008). In this case, we turn to Campbell’s (2007) institu-
tional theory of CSR, which seeks to identify the conditions
in which companies likely behave in socially responsible
ways in given national contexts. According to Campbell
(2007, p. 946), socially responsible or irresponsible
behavior is mediated by several institutional conditions,
including ‘‘public and private regulation; the presence of
non-governmental and other independent organizations that
monitor corporate behavior, institutionalized norms
regarding corporate behavior, associate behavior among
corporations themselves, and organized dialogs among
corporations and their stakeholders.’’ We speculate that the
institutionalization of CSR policies and practices in clus-
ters in the developing world similarly might be mediated
by such factors.
Cluster-based firms in developing countries likely
behave in socially responsible ways in the presence of
strong, well-enforced environmental and labor laws, par-
ticularly if they have been negotiated and reflect the con-
sensus of government, civil society, and firms in the
national context. In cluster-based settings, national, regio-
nal, or local regulatory authorities need technical expertise,
financial resources, and staff to monitor levels of
(non)compliance with the national labor and environmental
regulations, as they apply to manufacturing firms located in
clusters in the developing world. Conversely, in the
absence of effective government policies and enforcement,
we expect a substantial lowering of environmental and
labor standards in developing country clusters.
The spread of CSR policies and practices also should be
more likely in developing country clusters if their
enforcement is rigorously monitored by local or interna-
tional non-governmental organizations, trade unions, or
media outlets. In line with Coe and Hess (2013), we argue
that such monitoring might take place through labor
agency, such as when workers organized in trade unions
collectively bargain with cluster-based firms to improve
their work conditions. Labor agency also could be exer-
cised by unorganized workers who opt in or out of par-
ticular work forms, depending on their preferences and
broader life situations (Carswell and De Neve 2013).
Adopting the argument proposed by Lund-Thomsen
(2013), we speculate that unorganized workers exert pres-
sure on cluster-based firms by opting out of working for
factories with very poor health and safety records. How-
ever, the effectiveness of worker agency is severely con-
strained by several factors (Coe and Hess 2013), including
laws that restrict the rights of workers to organize freely,
disagreements within communities about how to deal with
local cluster-based firms, the ability of multinational
companies to redirect their sourcing to other clusters
elsewhere in the developing world, and the role of labor
market intermediaries that hire workers only on temporary
bases (Coe and Jordhus-Lier 2011).
Similarly, communities surrounding cluster-based firms
may engage in what Garvey and Newell (2005) call com-
munity-based corporate accountability strategies, aimed at
holding companies responsible for their social and
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environmental conduct. These strategies include attempts
at community-driven regulation (O’Rourke 2004), through
the use of weapons of the weak (Scott 1987), such as petty
blockages or sabotage of company operations. Communi-
ties may engage in community-based corporate account-
ability strategies, publicizing instances of non-compliance
with existing regulations through media outlets (Garvey
and Newell 2005). ‘‘Barefoot’’ or worker epidemiology
projects encourage people to identify their own health
conditions, such that they gather data about the social and
environmental costs of local industrial operations. Com-
munities then can contest the results of official reports
about the health situation of employees or arrange public
hearings to detail the actual environmental or social costs
of industrial production (O’Rourke 2004). In this sense, the
communities highlight the discrepancies between the
rhetoric of cluster-based CSR initiatives and the reality of
their implementation, as experienced by local communities
residing in industrial cluster settings. However, the effec-
tiveness of these community-based corporate accountabil-
ity strategies is limited by a wide range of state, corporate,
and community-based factors. For example, if states lack
provisions for public participation in assessments of envi-
ronmental impacts from industrial development projects,
communities might be unable to exercise influence over
company decisions. Similarly, paraphrasing Garvey and
Newell (2005), if local firms in clusters in the developing
world are not committed to stakeholder dialog, communi-
ties likely lack the power to make their voices heard.
Institutional theorists often emphasize the role of nor-
mative institutions and their significant influence on com-
pany behavior (Campbell 2007); such normative
institutions tend to differ across countries. For developing
country clusters, the presence of universities, business
schools, technical training institutes, or other support
institutions should promote awareness of the importance of
high labor and environmental standards. Such institutions
also could collaborate with cluster associations or cham-
bers of commerce to facilitate improved environmental
management by cluster-based firms. The presence of nor-
mative institutions could partly explain why CSR policies
and practices have been institutionalized in clusters in
developing countries; their absence might help explain why
local firms in some clusters pay little or no heed to envi-
ronmental and labor standards.
More generally, we agree with Campbell’s (2007)
argument that businesses are likely to behave in socially
responsible ways if they join business associations that
promote socially responsible behavior. Similarly, the lit-
erature on industrial clusters in developing countries sug-
gests that cluster-based firms may achieve competitive
advantages by engaging in joint action through industry
associations or public–private partnerships, in ways that
individual firms cannot achieve on their own (Schmitz and
Nadvi 1999). Industry associations can raise awareness of
CSR policies and practices among members, help train and
build members’ capacity in this area, and, at least in theory,
sanction non-compliance or unsafe, hazardous work envi-
ronments through peer pressure (Accountability 2006).
However, it remains difficult to make universal claims
about the effective potential of business associations in
clusters to promote socially responsible behavior among
members. Research into CSR in developing country clus-
ters frequently highlights the potential for free-riding; not
all members wish to join or pay for such initiatives (Lund-
Thomsen and Pillay 2012). The effectiveness of business
associations in fostering collective action initiatives, such
as those related to occupational health and safety in the
workplace, also depend on customer expectations (Lund-
Thomsen and Nadvi 2010b). In export-oriented developing
country clusters whose products sell in North American
and European markets, compliance with the corporate
codes of conduct of their Western clients is often a pre-
requisite of market access (Tewari and Pillai 2005). Thus,
the effectiveness of business associations in promoting
compliance with occupational health and safety standards
in clusters likely depends on the broader national institu-
tional context, the profile of the cluster’s buyers, and the
particular features of the cluster in which such actions
might be promoted.
Finally, Campbell (2007) proposes that companies
behave in more socially responsible ways in settings in
which they engage in regular, organized forms of dialog
with stakeholders, such as unions, employees, community
groups, investors, and other stakeholders. To promote CSR
International Level Factors 
Visible global value chains   Less Visible Clobal Value Chains 
       CSR Adoption        CSR Non-Adoption 
in Developing Country Clusters  in Developing Country Clusters 
National-Level Factors 
Strong Well Enforced Labor 
Environmental Laws 
Independent CSR Monitoring 
Effective, Well-organized 
Business Associations 
Organized Stakeholder Dialogue 
Community-based 
Corporate Accountability 
Strategies 
Weak, Non-enforced Labor and 
and Environmental Laws 
No Independent CSR Monitoring 
Weak, Poorly Organized 
Business Associations 
No Organized Stakeholder Dialogue 
No Community-based Corporate 
Accountability Strategies 
Fig. 1 A conceptual model of CSR (Non) Adoption in developing
country clusters
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policies and practices in developing country clusters, the
broader national political setting in which the cluster is
embedded could powerfully facilitate (non)compliance
with standards. In countries with a tradition of multiparty
democracy, including regular elections and institutional-
ized, tripartite dialog, cluster-based firms should be more
likely to engage in institutionalized forms of dialog with
employees and nearby communities about CSR issues (see
also Newell 2005). We offer an opposite prediction in more
authoritarian states that lack independent media channels,
freedom of association, the right to collective bargaining,
or a legal right to be heard. In such contexts, cluster-based
firms have fewer incentives to improve their CSR perfor-
mance (Lund-Thomsen 2004) (Fig. 1).
In parallel with this conceptual model, we develop a
series of propositions related to the interaction between
international and national institutional factors that affect
the (non)adoption of CSR in industrial clusters in devel-
oping countries.
Proposition 1 In a few developing country clusters, the
CSR policies and practices of first-tier supplier firms
improve as they become integrated into visible global value
chains, supported by local industry associations.
In the past two decades, significant interest has centered
on the intersection of ‘‘global’’ value chains and ‘‘local’’
industrial clusters in developing countries (Humphrey and
Schmitz 2002), often in light of the claim that integration
into the world economy provides local cluster firms with
opportunities to improve their products and production
processes by interacting with demanding global buyers, at
least in the short term (Schmitz and Nadvi 1999). However,
these local firms also face significant risks in the long run,
because global buyers can relocate their sourcing of pro-
ducts and services to other clusters, elsewhere in the
developing world (Bair and Gereffi 2001). A similar
argument holds that industrial clusters may achieve social
and environmental upgrading by interacting with brand-
sensitive global buyers who emphasize CSR in their
interactions with developing country suppliers. Yet the
literature also highlights the importance of local collective
institutions (e.g., business associations) to facilitate the
implementation of CSR policies and practices across
developing country clusters (Lund-Thomsen and Nadvi
2010a, b).
In reality though, in many industrial clusters in devel-
oping country clusters, global buyers are absent. Gulati
(2012) indicates that a relatively small proportion of
India’s more than 1200 industrial clusters are export ori-
ented, such that they never are exposed to the globally
demanding buyers envisaged by global value chain litera-
ture, unless those buyers have set up local branches within
India (Awasthi et al. 2010). Instead, these clusters address
the demands of regional and local buyers, most of which
are less concerned with the CSR performance of cluster-
based firms and more interested in price or quality con-
siderations (Mezzadri 2014b). In addition, it is necessary to
consider the functional division of labor within and among
industrial clusters in developing countries, to understand
their potential for and likely limits of engaging in CSR.
Proposition 2 Even in the few clusters that feature
improved CSR policies and practices among first-tier firms,
widespread outsourcing of production to lower-tier firms
occurs, for which labor rights violations and environmental
pollution are widespread.
The literature on industrial clusters highlights the
functional division of labor within and among clusters as a
key factor for enhancing their international competitive-
ness (Schmitz and Nadvi 1999). The ability of cluster-
based firms to engage in flexible production in response to
changing customer preferences and seasonal demand
changes by drawing on job-working firms and workers
constitutes a key strength for internationally competitive
clusters in the developing world (Nadvi 1999a). Yet this
advantage stems from price, delivery, and (sometimes)
quality considerations, not in relation to CSR. Cluster-
based firms often outsource, whether within their own
cluster or to other clusters, the most labor-intensive, haz-
ardous, or polluting steps of their production process to
networks of subcontractors that are hard to monitor for
CSR performance (Khara and Lund-Thomsen 2012; Lund-
Thomsen 2009). Even if so-called CSR-sensitive clusters
interact with globally demanding buyers, we anticipate that
only the first-tier firms might score well on the CSR
compliance requirements. This score even might function
as a de facto smokescreen to hide severe labor rights vio-
lations and environmental pollution throughout the lower
tiers of the cluster (Jamali et al. forthcoming; Posthuma
and Nathan 2010). The scale of labor rights violations and
environmental pollution in developing country clusters is
thus a key factor.
Proposition 3 In most developing country clusters, labor
rights violations and environmental pollution are wide-
spread, because the factors promoting CSR policies and
practices are either weakly present or entirely absent.
In reviewing empirical studies of environmental and labor
standards issues in developing country clusters, we deter-
mined that most CSR activities get implemented in piece-
meal fashion. For example, in assessing the environmental
initiatives by the Old Ardbennie Industrial Cluster in Harare,
Zimbabwe, Mbohwa et al. (2010) argue that even though the
effluent management by cluster-based firms was poor, they
achieved water usage savings. Jamali et al. (forthcoming)
note that cluster-based entrepreneurs engaged in successful
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collective philanthropic projects, even as labor rights vio-
lations remained rife in the subcontracted stitching center
and home-based units. We ascribe this partial commitment
to CSR in developing country clusters to the combination, or
perhaps absence, of pressures that drive SMEs in developing
country clusters to engage in sustained, coherent CSR. Even
as we acknowledge the potential capacity constraints related
to securing compliance with labor rights and proper envi-
ronmental management by micro-, small-, and medium-
scale entrepreneurs in developing country clusters (e.g.,
Dasgupta 2000), we believe that the piecemeal adoption of
(or complete non-engagement in) CSR policies and practices
in developing country clusters results from the lack of
drivers in their institutional environment. For example, in
the Sialkot and Jalandhar football clusters, both globally
demanding buyers and local cluster-based business associ-
ations had key roles in driving joint-action CSR initiatives,
but the bottom-up pressure fromworkers was lacking, due to
the poorly organized and, in the case of Jalandhar, corrupt
trade unions (Lund-Thomsen and Nadvi 2010a). Studying
leather manufacturing inMexico, Blackman and Kildegaard
(2010) find that state-level enforcement of national envi-
ronmental policies was ineffective, but industry-level
cooperation and informal, community-based monitoring of
the CSR performance of SMEs helped secure incremental
gains in environmental performance.
Conclusions
We have set out to explore what we know about the topic
of industrial clusters and CSR in developing countries,
what we do not know, and what we need to know about this
topic. In doing so, we have structured our analysis
according to the drivers of and barriers to CSR adoption in
industrial clusters, the main features of CSR activities
undertaken in cluster-based settings, the limitations of
these CSR activities, and the theoretical frameworks that
have been elaborated to conceptualize the link between
CSR and industrial cluster development. We also have
outlined a conceptual framework for analyzing the factors
that might enhance or undermine the institutionalization of
CSR in such clusters.
The main drivers of CSR initiatives in developing
countries include SME participation in global value chains,
business associations that facilitate joint-action initiatives,
social networks within clusters, the implementation of
national labor and environmental laws, and community-
based monitoring (whether by trade unions or community
members) of SMEs’ social and environmental perfor-
mance. However, our literature review also indicates that
the absence of many of these drivers constitutes primary
barriers to the implementation of CSR policies and
practices in SME clusters in the developing world. The
literature on CSR in developing country clusters also
highlights economic imperatives, the lack of governmental
willingness to enforce existing labor and environmental
laws, bribery by SME entrepreneurs, deliberate attempts by
local entrepreneurs to break union activity, and participa-
tion in local (rather than global) value chains as persistent
barriers to the promotion of CSR policies and practices in
developing country clusters.
Substantial work investigates environmental manage-
ment in clusters; studies of work conditions in developing
country clusters are fewer in number. Environmental
management literature tends to take a narrow, technical
focus on issues such as the business case for environ-
mental management, preventative versus reparative
treatments, and possible free-rider problems. A more
political interpretation of the nature and causes of envi-
ronmental change in industrial clusters is largely missing.
Research on labor conditions also is fairly scattered, with
few systematic attempts to document the quantity and
quality of work undertaken in developing country clus-
ters. A promising avenue has emerged though, in the
attention being paid to the agency of workers themselves
to improve their work conditions in developing country
clusters. Finally, with a notable exception (Nadvi and
Barrientos 2004), virtually no academic or policy-ori-
ented work systematically investigates the interface of
industrial clusters with poverty reduction in developing
countries. A key finding in relation to studies of envi-
ronmental management, work conditions, and poverty
reduction in developing country clusters is the potential
for trade-offs across different policy objectives. For
example, to reduce environmental pollution from cluster-
based SMEs, it may be necessary to close some of the
worst factories, which is likely to translate into job and
income losses for low-income entrepreneurs and their
families, thus compounding the material damages of
poverty rather than reducing them.
The relative lack of studies on CSR in industrial clusters
in developing countries is particularly acute in areas related
to child labor, labor conditions more broadly, and poverty
reduction. A similar gap appears in relation to the impacts
of CSR activities in cluster settings in developing coun-
tries. Few if any systematic impact assessments refer to
such CSR initiatives. The available anecdotal evidence
suggests that CSR initiatives may help clusters maintain
their license to operate, result in limited improvements in
water quality and savings from the introduction of cleaner
technologies, and help reduce the presence of child labor in
cluster settings. However, we are left with the impression
that these initiatives are limited in nature, piecemeal, and
insufficient to transform cluster development in more
socially and environmentally responsible ways.
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We were able to identify only two theoretical frame-
works (excluding those presented in this special issue) that
seek to explain the drivers of CSR initiatives in developing
country clusters; even here, the work remains preliminary.
This situation might be illustrative of the broader limita-
tions associated with CSR in developing countries. On the
one hand, the literature often highlights the role of buyer-
driven global value chains to promote the introduction of
Western-style CSR policies for clusters in the developing
world. On the other hand, the same literature stream rec-
ognizes how global buyer-driven value chains can under-
mine labor and environmental standards through cut-throat
pricing policies and the threat of relocating orders to other
low cost producers elsewhere in the developing world.
These global value chains accordingly seem to embody
contradictory pressures that exert real limits on how eco-
nomically, socially, and environmentally responsible an
SME’s behavior can be in developing country clusters.
Finally, our review highlights the continued risk that CSR
initiatives in developing country clusters become either an
exercise in economic and cultural imperialism or an
attempt by local SMEs to greenwash their environmentally
and social destructive activities.
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